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Abstract 
Previous empirical work on the link between domestic and foreign investment provides 
mixed results which partly depend on the level of aggregation of the data. We argue that 
the aggregated home country implications of foreign direct investment (FDI) cannot be 
gauged using firm-level data. Aggregated data, in turn, miss channels through which 
domestic and foreign activities interact. Instead, industry-level data provide useful 
information on the link between domestic and foreign investment. We theoretically show 
that the effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock depend on the structure of industries 
and the relative importance of domestic and multinational firms. Our model allows 
distinguishing intra-sector competition from inter-sector linkage effects. We test the 
model using data on German FDI. Using panel cointegration methods, we find evidence 
for a positive long-run impact of FDI on the domestic capital stock and on the stock of 
inward FDI. Effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock are driven mainly by intra-
sector effects. For inward FDI, inter-sector linkages matter as well. 
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1 Motivation 
Multinational activity has increased significantly in recent years. German multinationals 
are no exception in this regard. Overall, German firms account for about 10% of world 
outward FDI (Unctad 2006), and these investments have grown quite dynamically. 
Between 1989 and 2004, the stock of German outward foreign direct investment (FDI)1 
has increased from 2 to 8% of the total domestic capital stock of German firms 
(Figure 1). German firms hold about twice as much capital abroad as foreigners hold in 
Germany. German firms have doubled the number of workers in their foreign affiliates 
from 2 to 4 million or the equivalent of 10% of the domestic workforce. Employment in 
affiliates of foreign firms in Germany has increased less dynamically from about 1 to 1.5 
million workers.  
The labor market implications of increased FDI have received much attention in the 
political arena, in the media, and in academic research (see, e.g., Becker and Muendler 
2006). The integration of countries in Eastern Europe and in Asia that are richly endowed 
with labor has given rise to concerns that persistent unemployment may be the result of 
increased FDI. Low-skilled labor in Germany might be particularly affected.  
As regards the long-run implications of FDI, the impact on the domestic capital stock is 
even more important. Yet, there is relatively little empirical evidence on the link between 
the domestic capital stock and FDI.2 At first sight, aggregated data suggest that increased 
FDI has not had a significantly negative impact on the domestic capital stock. Over the 
past decade, the aggregated capital stock has instead remained almost unchanged.  
Still, developments of the aggregated capital stock might cloud important differences in 
adjustment across industries. In this paper, we thus use data at a semi-aggregated level 
that allow considering channels of interaction between domestic and foreign investment. 
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we use a theoretical model that nests 
                                                 
1  Unless indicated otherwise, we use FDI to denote the stock of capital invested abroad. 
2  In their survey of the home country effects of FDI, Barba-Navaretti et al. (2004, Chapter 9) focus on 
the complementarity between domestic and foreign employment, and on the effects of FDI on 
technology and productivity. 
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different types of multinational activity and that allows for input- and output-market 
linkages among industries. We use the model to derive implications on the effects of FDI 
on the domestic capital stock. Second, we break up domestic capital into the investment 
of domestic and of foreign firms (inward FDI). Third, we estimate the links between 
domestic and foreign investment activities using data that are aggregated at the industry-
level. Our data allow estimating the impact of input- and output market linkages on the 
relationship between domestic capital and FDI. We also distinguish intra-sector 
competition from inter-sector linkage effects. 
We are not the first to analyze the links between FDI and domestic capital. There are 
rather two strands in the existing empirical literature addressing this link. A first strand of 
literature uses aggregated data. Feldstein (1995) finds a negative correlation between FDI 
and domestic investment in US data. He regresses domestic investment on domestic 
savings and on FDI, accounting for the endogeneity of FDI using instrumental variable 
techniques. Hence, the paper looks at the aggregated consequences of FDI for domestic 
investment. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005a) replicate this study using more recent data 
from OECD-countries for the 1980s and 1990s and, again, find a negative relationship in 
aggregated data. For a time series of aggregated investment stocks of US multinational 
firms, in contrast, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005a) find a positive association between 
domestic and foreign investment. Faeth (2006) also finds a positive relation using 
Australian balance of payments data. Recent studies also use German data. Using 
German balance of payments data, Lipponer (2006b) finds no evidence for a negative 
impact of FDI on domestic investment. Herzer and Schrooten (2007) analyze the 
cointegration relationship between domestic capital formation and FDI outflows. They 
find a positive relationship for the US and a negative relationship for Germany. None of 
these studies allows studying the links between FDI and domestic capital at an industry-
level. 
A second strand of literature uses firm-level data, again mostly for the US. Desai, Foley, 
and Hines (2005b) use information on the investment of US multinationals to link 
changes in different types of domestic activities of US multinationals to changes in the 
foreign activities of these firms. They find a positive impact of FDI: firms that invest 
abroad also tend to invest more in the home economy.  
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So, at least for the US, the link between domestic investment and FDI partly differs in the 
aggregated and in the firm-level data. There are several possible reasons for this 
observation. First, across different firms that invest abroad, the correlation between 
domestic and foreign investment need not be the same. Aggregation across firms might 
thus cloud different adjustment patterns at the firm-level. Second, firm-level studies 
disregard the general equilibrium effects of FDI for the investment of other firms. If some 
firms engage in FDI, other firms might be affected as well. Competition might become 
more intense; output and product market conditions for competitors, suppliers, and 
customers of firms engaging in FDI may change. And, third, the differences between 
studies at different levels of aggregation might simply be due to differences in the data 
used. Some studies use balance of payments data, while others use foreign direct 
investment stock statistics.  
When comparing results from studies using aggregated and firm-level data, one also 
needs to bear in mind that these studies answer different types of questions. While using 
firm-level data is of interest when testing specific partial-equilibrium effects of FDI, it is 
the aggregated employment or investment implications that are important from a 
macroeconomic perspective and, not least, for policy makers. 
In this paper, we argue that both approaches used in the literature do not tell the full story 
about the linkages between FDI and the domestic capital stock. Aggregation across firms 
and industries does not allow shedding light on sources of complementarities between 
domestic and foreign investment. Using firm-level data does not allow analyzing 
feedback effects between different firms. Assessing the effects of FDI on domestic 
activities on the basis of firm-level data requires performing a counterfactual 
experiment.3 Using, for instance, matching models, one needs to find a group of 
comparable ‘non-treated’ firms and to associate the outcome (here: domestic capital) of 
the ‘treated’ firms (here: FDI) to the outcomes of their ‘neighbors’ in a comparison 
group. By definition, such firm-level estimation procedures ignore the impact that FDI of 
some firms can have on other, non-comparable firms.  
                                                 
3  See Becker and Muendler (2006) or Kleinert and Toubal (2006) for evidence using German data and 
testing the labor market implications of FDI. 
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We follow an intermediate route by using semi-aggregated data at the industry-level. We 
explicitly model the impact of FDI on other, non-comparable firms in the same sector, on 
suppliers, and on customers of the firm under consideration. Hence, our model allows 
distinguishing intra-sector competition from inter-sector spill-over effects of FDI. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are hardly any empirical papers studying the effects 
of FDI on domestic investment at the industry-level empirically. An exception is work by 
Hejazi and Pauly (2002, 2003) for Canada. They find no statistically significant link 
between outward FDI and domestic investment across all industries while inward FDI 
supplements domestic capital formation. However, their study does show a substantial 
degree of heterogeneity when gross fixed capital formation is broken down in its 
components, by industry, and by partner country. 
Also, theoretical work on the link between FDI and the domestic capital stock is scarce. 
A few previous papers have also modeled the link between FDI and domestic capital 
theoretically. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005b) have a partial equilibrium model in which 
multinational firms simultaneously choose domestic and foreign inputs. Their focus is on 
the form of the production function and on how it affects the complementarity between 
domestic and foreign capital. Our model, in contrast, focuses on the effects that changes 
in the activities of multinational firms have for domestic firms via changes in output 
prices and via linkages between firms in different industries. To analyze this relationship, 
we use a production function that captures the complementarity between domestic and 
foreign capital at the firm level. This choice is motivated by the empirical results of 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2005b).4 Barba-Navaretti et al. (2004: Chapter 3) likewise have 
a model with backward and forward linkages between industries. They analyze the 
effects of FDI on the host economy by distinguishing product market, factor market, and 
linkage effects. Linkage effects arise through demand and supply linkages between 
MNEs and local firms. These linkages can generate positive spillovers between 
multinational and domestic production which can offset or overturn potential negative 
product or factor market effects. In contrast to our work, the focus of Barba-Navaretti et 
                                                 
4  Results using data for German multinationals suggest a positive relationship between foreign and 
domestic activities as well (see, e.g., Kleinert and Toubal 2006). 
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al. (2004) is on the host country effects of horizontal FDI, and they do not consider the 
impact of FDI on the capital stock. 
In Part 2, we present a theoretical model which provides the intuition for the linkages 
between the domestic and the foreign capital stock. The model distinguishes the effects of 
FDI in the same sector from FDI in input and output industries, and we model intra-sector 
competition as well as inter-sector linkage effects. We also analyze effects of FDI on 
domestic and multinational firms. In Part 3, we describe our data. In Part 4, we present 
the empirical analysis. We distinguish long-run and short-run effects of FDI, and we use 
detailed industry-level information to separate effects of FDI in different industries. 
Using panel cointegration techniques, we find evidence for a positive impact of outward 
FDI in the same sector on the domestic capital stock and on the stock of inward FDI. To 
some extent, this effect includes effects of input- and output-sector linkages as, on 
average, about 30% of inputs and outputs are traded within industries. Apart from that, 
we find no evidence of significant inter-industry linkage effects for domestic firms. 
Inward FDI, in contrast, is positively affected by FDI of input and output sectors. Our 
results also suggest that the long-run effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock should 
be studied as the short-run dynamics are rather unstable. 
2 Theoretical Model 
2.1 General Set-Up 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate how foreign investment 
affects the domestic capital stock at the industry-level. For this purpose, we distinguish 
foreign direct investment in three different industries: FDI that is carried out by firms in 
the industry under consideration, called industry Y, FDI that is done by firms in industries 
that deliver inputs to industry Y, called industry I, and FDI that is carried out by firms in 
industries that produce output with inputs received from industry Y, called industry O. 
Hence, our model allows analyzing home country effects of FDI through backward and 
forward linkages. 
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To assess how FDI in these three different industries affects the domestic capital stock, 
we further need to distinguish three types of firms active in industry Y on the home 
market: Purely domestic enterprises (PDE), domestic multinational enterprises (MNE), 
and foreign held enterprises (FHE). Purely domestic enterprises are owned by domestic 
owners, produce locally and serve only the domestic output market. Multinational 
enterprises are owned by domestic owners and operate (produce and sell) both on the 
home market and abroad. Foreign held enterprises are owned by foreigners and operate 
both on the home market and abroad. In our empirical analysis, we will be able to 
distinguish the domestic demand for capital of domestic companies (i.e. MNEs plus 
PDEs), and of foreign held companies (FHEs).  
We describe firms by their production function. Thus, we do not consider in detail how a 
firm chooses to organize its production, as captured by the recent literature on the theory 
of the firm. (See, e.g., Barba-Navaretti et al. (2004: Chapter 5).) Our reduced form of 
describing a firm allows focusing on the profitability effects arising from FDI.  
The production possibilities of the three types of firms, MNEs, PDEs and FHEs can be 
characterized as follows. Multinational firms produce for the domestic market with a 
production function )~,,~,( ffff KKLLf  where )
~( ff KK  is capital invested domestically 
(abroad) and )~( ff LL  is any other input employed domestically (abroad). L could be any 
other non-traded factor input which, for convenience, we call ‘labor’. A ∼ denotes foreign 
variables. This production function captures the idea that the MNE takes advantage of the 
possibility to locate part of its production abroad. Domestic firms are characterized by a 
production function . Finally, foreign held firms produce with a production 
function 
),( gg KLg
)~,,~,( hhhh KKLLh . Like MNEs, FHEs have access to foreign production 
opportunities. For notational convenience, we assume that all MNEs are completely 
symmetric and so are all PDEs and FHEs.  
We use the following specifications of production functions for the domestic market: 
f f f f
f f f f f f f ff (L , L , K , K ) L L K K
α α β β=      
g
g g g gg(L , K ) L K
α β= g        (1) 
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h h h h
h h h h h h h hh(L , L , K , K ) L L K K
α α β β=      
To rule out economies of scale, we restrict the sum of the factor shares in the production 
function to .1≤+∑∑ βα 5 We focus on the short- to medium-run, where the number 
of firms is exogenously given, but the firms choose inputs – including the capital stock – 
to maximize their profits. The total number of firms is normalized to 1. For notational 
convenience, we assume that all firms produce homogenous goods. Thus, the domestic 
product market can be described by a demand function , where X is total output 
produced by MNEs, FHEs and PDEs. The market price p adjusts such that the product 
market is cleared. All firms take the market price as given, i.e. all firms behave as price 
takers. A straightforward extension of our analysis would allow firms to produce 
heterogeneous goods. In this case, demand would not be characterized by a single market 
price, but rather by product specific prices, with negative cross price elasticities and 
hence similar competition effects as described below.  
)(Xp
We assume that MNEs, PDEs and FHEs maximize profits by choosing factor inputs, 
taking as given domestic (foreign) factor prices )~(ww  for labor and )~(rr  for capital. Due 
to restrictions in the mobility of labor, factor prices need not be equalized internationally. 
However, firms will choose their input demand such as to optimally take advantage of 
factor price differences. We take a partial equilibrium approach and do not take into 
account the impact of industries’ factor demand on overall factor prices.  
The profit functions of MNEs, FHEs and PDEs are given as 
ffffffffMNE KrrKLwwL)K,,KL,(X) f(Lp 
~~~~~~ −−−−=π  
 KrrKLwwL)K,,KL,(X) h(Lp hhhhhhhhFHE
~~~~~~ −−−−=π    (2) 
 rKwL),K(X) g(Lp ggggPDE −−=π . 
                                                 
~
5  This specification requires that multinational firms have non-zero inputs of foreign capital and labor. 
To rule out the possibility that a termination of foreign activities would jeopardize domestic 
production, we could use ββαα ~ )~1()~1( KKLL ++ as an alternative specification. This would leave our 
main results unaffected while making the exposition more cumbersome. 
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We start by investigating how factor demand reacts to changes in input and output prices. 
We then address the specific effects of foreign direct investments in different industries. 
Lemma 1 
Consider an increase in domestic output price p, due to an exogenous change in demand. 
Then all firms increase their factor demand for both L and K. 
Proof: See Appendix 
Lemma 2 
Consider a decrease in the domestic input price w. Then all firms increase their factor 
demand for K and L. 
Proof: See Appendix 
Lemma 3 
Consider a decrease in foreign input price w~ . Then MNE and FHE increase their factor 
demand for K~  and for K whereas PDE decreases its factor demand for K. 
Proof: See Appendix 
Table 1: Industry-Level Effects of FDI 
       FDI originating 
 from  
FDI                     
motivated by 
Industry Y Industry I Industry O 
Lower foreign input 
prices (vertical FDI) 
Case 1 
MNE and FHE 
experience 
reduction in w~  
Case 3a 
MNE, PDE and 
FHE experience 
reduction in input 
prices 
Case 4a 
MNE, PDE and 
FHE experience 
either decrease in p 
or increase in p 
Higher foreign 
output prices 
(horizontal FDI) 
Case 2 
MNE, PDE and 
FHE experience 
increase in p if 
output prices 
develop symmetri-
cally at home and 
abroad 
Case 3b 
No impact on MNE, 
PDE and FHE 
 
Case 4b 
MNE, PDE and 
FHE experience 
increase in p 
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2.2 Effects of Vertical and Horizontal FDI 
For our analysis of how FDI affects the domestic capital stock, we have to distinguish the 
motivation that is driving the foreign investment. An increase in the foreign capital stock 
could be driven by production cost considerations or by market seeking motivations. The 
first type of investment is called a vertical investment; the second type is called a 
horizontal investment. To fix ideas, we will capture these two motivations of investment 
by a change in foreign input prices, on the one hand, and by a change in output prices, on 
the other hand. So, a vertical investment can be thought of as being motivated by a 
reduction in foreign input prices, for instance because of the integration of labor-rich 
countries of Eastern Europe and Asia into the world economy. A horizontal investment 
can be thought of as being motivated by an increase in foreign output prices, for instance 
because of the increased demand of the newly emerging markets or by a reduction in 
transaction cost that affects the net revenue from foreign sales.  
The effects of FDI on the home economy depend on the motive driving the foreign 
investment, and input and output sectors may be affected differently. Recall that we study 
FDI in three different industries. In each industry, FDI may be motivated by a change in 
the input price or a change in the output price in the foreign market. Thus, there are six 
potential scenarios to be considered. Table 1 summarizes the implications of these six 
different scenarios from the point of view of firms in industry Y.  
 
Case 1: Effects of vertical FDI in the same industry  
Consider first a vertical foreign investment that is driven by improved production 
opportunities abroad. We capture this effect by a change in the relative foreign input 
prices, in particular a change in w~ , while keeping r~ constant. Without loss of generality, 
we restrict attention to MNEs and PDEs for this purpose. The total number of firms is 
normalized to 1, and the share of MNEs and PDEs is given by q and (1-q) respectively. 
Thus, total output is gqqfX )1( −+= .  
From Lemma 3 above we know that a decrease in the foreign price for labor, w~ , induces 
a MNE to increase its employment of foreign labor and hence, due to the positive cross 
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derivatives of the production function, also the foreign and the domestic capital stock. 
This leads to an increase in domestic production and hence a lower market price p. From 
Lemma 1, however, we know that a decrease in p reduces factor demand. This has a 
negative effect on PDEs, which use less domestic labor and less domestic capital. The 
overall effect is summarized in the following result. 
Result 1 
Consider FDI from sector Y that is motivated by a decrease in the foreign price for labor 
w~ . This has two effects: 
• The domestic capital stock by MNEs increases and  fK
• the domestic capital stock  by PDEs decreases. gK
The overall effect on the domestic capital stock depends on the price effect on the 
domestic product market and is more likely to be positive 
• the larger the share of MNEs, q, and 
• the less price elastic product demand. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Thus, the overall effect depends on the strength of the negative price effect and on the 
relative market shares of MNEs and PDEs.  
Total production for the home market cannot decrease. If this were the case, the domestic 
output price would increase and so would the production by PDEs. But due to the 
increase in competitiveness of MNEs, production by PDEs is to some extent replaced by 
production by MNEs. Since MNEs produce with both, foreign and domestic capital, total 
domestic capital may decrease even though total domestic plus foreign capital increases. 
We have ignored FHEs so far. How would they be affected in this case of vertical 
investment? As multinationals, they should benefit from improved production 
opportunities like MNEs, and they should react like MNEs with an increase in production 
and in domestic input demand. 
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Case 2: Effects of horizontal FDI in the same industry  
We interpret a horizontal foreign investment as being driven by an increase in the foreign 
output price, for example due to an increase in foreign market size. How would this affect 
domestic production and factor demand? One possibility could be that the foreign output 
price increase reflects a global economic upswing, leading also to an increase in the 
domestic output price. In this case, we can capture the effect of a horizontal investment 
by an increase in domestic output price p. The more correlated changes in demand abroad 
and at home are, and thus the more symmetric changes in prices, the more likely is a 
positive impact on the domestic market.  
If, however, the foreign output price increase is purely local, we would still expect 
domestic production to be affected due to positive externalities of foreign on domestic 
production.6 In this case, the effects would be analogous to those resulting from a 
reduction in foreign input prices as analyzed in Case 1. Using Lemma 1 we can 
summarize the results as follows: 
Result 2 
Consider FDI from sector Y that is motivated by an increase in the foreign market price. 
Suppose the domestic market price increases as well. Then the domestic capital stock by 
MNEs, PDEs and FHEs increases. The smaller the domestic price increase, the less likely 
is an increase of the domestic capital stock.  
 
Case 3: Effects of FDI in input industries  
Next, we consider foreign investment that is made by firms in industry I delivering inputs 
to industry Y. If this investment is motivated by output price changes (Case 3b), then 
there is no reason to expect an impact on industry Y. If, however, the investment is 
motivated by input price changes (Case 3a), then all firms in industry Y experience a 
reduction in their input prices. In this sense, FDI in input industries has effects similar to 
those resulting from outsourcing of stages of production in the same industry. We capture 
                                                 
6  Foreign production is not modelled explicitly but it can be thought of as being symmetric to domestic 
production insofar as foreign capita and domestic capital are complements. 
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this effect by a reduction in the price for domestic input L, w. As shown in Lemma 2 we 
get the following result: 
Result 3 
Consider FDI in input industry I that is motivated by lower input prices abroad. This 
leads to a reduction in the domestic input price w for firms in industry Y which in turn 
leads to an increase in the domestic capital stock. 
 
Case 4: Effects of FDI in output industries 
Finally, we turn to investments that are undertaken in industry O that is buying inputs 
from industry Y. If the investment is driven by an input price reduction abroad (Case 4a) 
and if this input is a substitute for the input produced in industry Y, then a reduction in 
output prices for the industry under consideration will result. If instead the investment 
abroad is motivated by changes in price from inputs that are complementary to the input 
produced by the industry under consideration, or if the investment is motivated by an 
increase in output prices abroad (Case 4b), then output prices would increase. As shown 
in Lemma 1, this leads to the following results. 
Result 4 
Consider FDI in the output industry that is motivated by lower input prices abroad. If the 
inputs are substitutes for the inputs produced in industry Y, firms in industry Y experience 
a reduction in output price p and hence reduce their domestic capital stock. If the inputs 
are complements or if the FDI in the output industry is motivated by higher output prices 
abroad, firms in industry Y experience an increase in output price p and hence increase 
their domestic capital stock. 
 
In sum, our theoretical model has a couple of testable implications: 
First, the effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock in any particular industry depend on 
the motive that drives the foreign investment as well as on the industry from which this 
foreign investment originates.  
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Second, market seeking (horizontal) investment tends to have a positive impact, 
production cost motivated (vertical) investments can have both, a positive or a negative 
impact. Positive effects of vertical FDI are more likely the less price elastic industry 
demand and the larger the share of multinational firms in this industry.  
Third, FDI in input industries tends to have a positive impact on the domestic capital 
stock whereas FDI in output industries can have a positive or a negative effect. 
3 The Data  
To test the above model, we need a dataset which provides industry-level information on 
the volume of FDI, on the domestic capital stock of domestic and foreign firms, on the 
number of multinationals and purely domestic firms, on input-output linkages across 
industries as well as on the employment at the industry-level. Here, we describe the data 
that we use to test the predictions of this model.7   
3.1 Data on Foreign Direct Investment 
Our industry-level data on inward and outward FDI come from the firm-level database 
MiDi (Micro database Direct Investment, formerly ‘International Capital Links’) 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. (For details on this database see Lipponer 
(2006a).) The MiDi-database is a full sample survey of German firms’ foreign affiliates 
and of foreign firms’ affiliates in Germany, and it contains comprehensive information on 
affiliates’ balance sheets.  
We aggregate the data using standard NACE sectors which allow combining our FDI 
data with industry-level data obtained from the German Statistical Office. The original 
MiDi-database contains information on more than 100 industries, following NACE 
Rev. 1 categories, and these can be aggregated into 37 broader industries. We use only 
standard manufacturing and services industries. We drop industries such as agriculture, 
mining and quarrying, public institutions, or households. Out of the industries dropped, 
                                                 
7  Details on the data specification and sources are given in the appendix. 
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holding companies, which account for about 46% of total outward FDI, are particularly 
important. The final dataset includes 13 manufacturing and 9 services industries.  
Investments with a volume below a certain threshold need not be reported, and the 
reporting limits have changed over time. To avoid changes in our explanatory variables 
resulting from changes in reporting limits, we drop all observations that are not covered 
by the most restrictive reporting requirements. Overall, we delete about 60% of the 
number of firm-level observations (see Table 2). The loss of observations is less severe 
for the total volume of activities as we drop the smaller units. The mean size of foreign 
affiliates increases moving from the full to the restricted sample by about 40%. For 
outward FDI, this increase is relatively uniform across the size measures used (affiliate 
sales, affiliate employment, and volume of FDI). For inward FDI, mean affiliate sales and 
employment increase by about 40% but the mean volume of FDI is almost unchanged.  
We create a dataset that contains two main measures of multinational activity: the volume 
of sales of foreign affiliates of German firms and the number of foreign affiliates by 
industry. The same type of information is obtained for affiliates of foreign held firms in 
Germany.  
In our theoretical model, we have stressed the importance of distinguishing vertically and 
horizontally-integrated multinationals. Empirically, we cannot directly distinguish 
between the two motivations of FDI, i.e. we cannot identify changes in foreign input 
prices or foreign output prices for each investment project. In order to capture the 
motives for FDI indirectly, we split the data in two ways. First, we split the data into 
multinational activity with high-income countries – for which horizontal FDI is likely to 
dominate – and with low-income countries and accession states – for which vertical FDI 
is likely to prevail. Second, we split the data into cases where the parent and affiliate are 
active in the same industry (as a proxy for horizontal FDI) and into cases where parent 
and affiliate are active in different industries (as a proxy for vertical FDI). For this 
breakdown, we use the finer industry-level disaggregation contained in the data. This 
classification is possible only for outward FDI since we do not have information on the 
sector of the foreign parent.  
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3.2 Industry-Level Explanatory Variables 
The MiDi-database does not provide information on a number of control variables of 
interest. Most importantly, it contains very little information on the parent firms. We 
therefore obtain industry-level information from the OECD’s STAN database and from 
the German Statistical Office. During our sample period (1991-2004), the Federal 
Statistical Office changed industry classifications for the national accounts twice. The 
data that we use have been adjusted for these changes. For employment and hourly 
wages, we use data from national accounts, which are compatible with International 
Labour Organization (ILO) standards. We additionally include a dummy variable for the 
post-unification period which might also pick up some of the effects of the 
reclassification of industries described above. 
3.3 Measuring Capital Stocks 
Our main dependent variable is the domestic capital stock. Ideally, we would split up the 
domestic capital stock into the capital owned by purely domestic firms (PDE), by 
domestic multinationals (MNE), and by foreign multinationals (FHE). Unfortunately, we 
have no comprehensive dataset which would allow identifying purely domestic and 
domestic multinational firms. We therefore decompose the capital stock in Germany into 
the capital owned by all domestic and by foreign firms. We define the total capital stock 
as FHED KKK += , where FHEK  = stock of inward FDI, and DK  = domestic capital 
stock of domestic firms. We obtain the domestic capital stock owned by residents by 
subtracting the stock of inward FDI from the total capital stock, . We 
measure inward and outward foreign direct investment using the MiDi-database and 
aggregating the data by industry and year. Data on aggregated capital stocks come from 
the German Statistical Office. Using these distinctions, we thus have the domestic capital 
stocks owned by residents and owned by non-residents (inward FDI) as dependent 
variables. 
DK K K= − FHE
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3.4 Measuring Industry Linkages 
One advantage of using industry-level data is that we can analyze the effect of FDI in 
other industries. Using industry-level input-output tables obtained from the German 
Statistical Office, we construct a year-specific weight of each industry in the inputs and 
outputs of other industries. Using these weights, we split up FDI into FDI in industries 
providing inputs and industries buying the outputs of industry i.  
More specifically, we include not only FDI in industry i but also FDI of input and output 
sectors denoting  as the weighted amount of FDI that industry i ,,receives’’ via 
inputs from other industries in year t and  as the amount of FDI that is attributable 
to industry i via its output-links to other industries.  
I
itFDI
O
itFDI
We define  as the weighted sum of FDI from all industries k that 
deliver inputs to industry i. We calculate the weights as the proportion of inputs that 
industry i receives from industry k relative to its total inputs 
∑= k ktkitIit FDIwFDI
itkitk kitkitkit
inpinpinpinpw == ∑  with ∑ ==k itkit ww 1  and inp = value added in input 
sectors.  
We define  as the weighted sum of FDI from industries j that 
industry i delivers outputs to, where 
∑= j jtjitOit FDIwFDI
itjitj jitjitjit
outpoutpoutpoutpw == ∑ , with 
 and outp = value added in output sectors.  ∑ ==j itjit ww 1
We have information on time-varying input-output sector shares from 1991 only through 
the year 2000. Hence, in order to avoid loosing observations for recent years, we use the 
weights for the year 2000 as a proxy for the weights in the years 2001-2003. The weights 
of inputs (outputs) received from (delivered to) the own sector are set equal to zero. 
Otherwise, we would double-count own sector FDI. On average, these intra-sector input-
output linkages account for about 30% of industries’ inputs and outputs. Hence, for a 
large share of the total inputs and outputs, we cannot separate the competition from the 
linkage effects identified in the theoretical model. Finding an effect of same-sector FDI 
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could thus be due to a positive direct impact of FDI on the domestic capital stock or an 
indirect effect working through inter-firm linkages. 
Recall from our theoretical considerations above that the impact of FDI on the domestic 
capital stock in industry i depends on who is investing abroad and for what reason. We 
expect FDI in the industry from which industry i receives inputs to have a positive impact 
on the domestic capital stock. The effect of FDI in the industry to which industry i 
supplies outputs can be positive or negative, positive in case of a market seeking 
investment, positive or negative in case of a production cost motivated investment. 
4 Empirical Model and Regression Results 
The theoretical model has shown that the impact of FDI on the domestic capital stock is 
not clear a priori. The impact rather depends on the input and output linkages between 
industries, on the price elasticity of output demand, on the importance of multinationals 
in each industry, and on the importance of horizontal and vertical FDI. In this section, we 
describe the empirical model that we estimate to gauge the effects of FDI on the domestic 
capital stock and to test the importance of input-output sector linkages. 
4.1 Empirical Model 
The baseline empirical model that we estimate gives the response of the domestic capital 
stock owned by residents  to the price of labor and the levels of employment, output, 
and FDI: 
D
itK
 ( )1 2 3 4 ,Dit o it it it i ititK w p L Y FDI dα β β β β δ ′= + + + + + + ε     (3) 
where  is a vector including inward and outward FDI, itFDI ( )itpw  = real hourly wages, 
= employment,  = output. itL itY itε is an error term, i=1, ... , 21 denotes the industry, and t 
= 1991, ... , 2004 is time. Multinational activity is captured through the volume of inward 
and outward FDI and the number of multinationals in each industry. In contrast to Desai 
et al. (2005b), who do not control for the level of output, this specification estimates the 
ceteris paribus effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock at a given scale of activities. 
(See Hanson et al. (2003) for a similar specification using the demand for labor as the 
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dependent variable.) All variables are in logs, thus the coefficients can be interpreted as 
elasticities. 
Ideally, we would also include a proxy for the real interest rate. However, we are 
unaware of data that measures the interest rate at the industry-level. We include a full set 
of industry fixed effects (δ ′ ) through which we aim to capture differences across 
industries such as differences in (real) interest rates.  
4.2 Long-Run Determinants of the Domestic Capital Stock 
We estimate equation (3) using data aggregated across industries and years. In addition, 
we also estimate the response of the log of the stock of inward FDI to a similar set of 
explanatory variables: ( )1 2 3 4 5 ,FHE D outwardit o it it it it i ititK w p L Y K FDI dα β β β β β δ ′= + + + + + + + ε  
When using the capital stock as a dependent variable, the potential non-stationarity of the 
data becomes an issue. Our model is a fairly typical macro-panel with a similar 
dimension of the cross-section N = 21 and the time series T = 13 (1991-2003). Ignoring 
non-stationarity of the data may thus lead to spurious regressions, as in time series data. 
We run panel unit root tests to check whether our variables might be non-stationary. The 
results of these tests, which are reported in Table 3, provide evidence for outward FDI to 
be non-stationary. For some other variables, the results are less clear cut and depend on 
the specific unit root test chosen. Moreover, panel unit root tests can be biased against 
finding evidence for unit roots if the cross-sections are cointegrated, i.e. if developments 
across industries are affected by a common trend (Banerjee et al. 2005). Using the panel 
unit root test proposed in Breitung and Das (2005), which accounts for cross-sectional 
dependence, in fact provides somewhat greater evidence for the presence of a unit root 
than tests assuming cross-sectional independence. In the following, we therefore proceed 
under the assumption that our main variables of interest could be non-stationary. 
We have two options for dealing with non-stationary data. One option is to first 
difference all data in logs and to estimate the model in growth rates rather than log-levels. 
This method has the advantage that the dependent variable is stationary. It has the 
disadvantage that information on the long-run relationships among the variables of 
interest is lost. Essentially, such a model explains the short-run variation of changes in 
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the capital stock, but it does not give their long-run determinants. The second method is 
to test for cointegration among the variables of interest and to estimate the long-run 
cointegration coefficients.  
Since our main interest is in the long-run effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock, we 
test for the presence of a long-run cointegration relationship among our variables of 
interest by estimating a cointegrated panel model (Breitung 2005). For a VAR(1) model, 
the cointegrated model has the following Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
representation: 
ittiiit yy εβα +=Δ −1,         (4) 
with t = 0,1,…,T and i = 1,…,N, ( ) 0=itE ε , ( )'it itEεσ ε ε= . This specification requires the 
long-run cointegration relationship ( β ) to be identical across cross-sections while the 
loading coefficients and thus the speed of adjustment ( iα ) vary for each industry i. Since 
the cointegration estimator requires a balanced panel, we drop all industries which have 
incomplete time series for the main variables of interest. This leaves us with our sample 
of T = 13 and N = 21. 
Before looking at the estimated long-run cointegration coefficients, Table 4 provides 
results of cointegration tests. These results support the presence of cointegration 
relationships among the variables of interest. Some specifications for the domestic capital 
stock at the industry-level are exceptions. Yet, these specifications apply tests for panel 
cointegration which do not allow for cross-section heterogeneity. This is an unrealistic 
assumption considering the ongoing process of structural change and thus different time 
trends across industries. 
In Tables 5a and 5b, we present estimates for the long-run cointegration coefficients 
using four different specifications: an OLS model, a fully modified OLS regression 
(FMOLS), a dynamic OLS regression (DOLS), and the Two-Step estimator proposed in 
Breitung (2005). Both, the FMOLS and the DOLS estimator, address serial correlation 
and endogeneity of the regressors. The FMOLS estimator corrects the OLS estimator 
non-parametrically, while the DOLS estimator uses information from past and future 
leads and lags of all variables. We also present four specifications: the baseline 
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specifications for the domestic capital stock and the stock of inward FDI (Tables 5a 
and 5b) as well as the specifications using FDI of input and output sectors as additional 
explanatory variables (Tables 5c and 5d). To save space, we report these specifications 
only for the Two-Step estimator. 
Baseline Regressions 
Table 5a shows that our model explains about two thirds of the variation in the domestic 
capital stock and FDI across industries. The explanatory power for inward FDI increases 
significantly as we add outward FDI as a regressor. Employment and wages have a 
positive and significant effect on the domestic capital stock. The employment and wage 
elasticities are estimated relatively consistently across the different specifications (around 
0.40), with a somewhat greater range for the wage elasticities. The impact of output is 
positive. Both, the stock of inward and of outward FDI have a positive effect on the 
domestic capital stock, but the elasticities are small (0.04).  
Inward FDI also reacts positively to outward FDI, but the estimated elasticity is much 
higher than for the domestic capital stock (around 0.50) (Table 5b). Recall that inward 
FDI measures domestic investment of foreign-held firms. Thus, we expect inward FDI to 
react to outward FDI as domestic investment of German multinationals. The larger 
coefficient confirms our prediction that domestic capital investment of purely domestic 
firms plus German multinationals should react less positively than domestic investment 
of foreign-held multinationals (inward FDI).  
The main difference between the regressions for inward FDI and the domestic capital 
stock is the effect of the control variables. Employment has a negative impact on inward 
FDI, and the impact of wages differs across specifications. In the baseline equations, the 
effect of wages is positive as well, but it turns negative in some specifications if we 
additionally use FDI measures as regressors. The elasticity of inward FDI with respect to 
output is positive and significant. The estimated elasticity is close to one. The link 
between inward FDI and the domestic capital stock is positive and significant as well. 
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Inter-Sector Linkage Effects 
So far, we have focused on the effects of FDI in the same sector on domestic capital. 
These include intra-sector competition as well as linkage effects, to the extent that inputs 
and outputs are traded within sectors. Next, we turn to the results on inter-sector linkages. 
Tables 5c and 5d have the results including the FDI of input and output sectors. In 
addition to inward and outward FDI of the same industry, we add inward and outward 
FDI of input and output sectors,  and , as described in section 3.4. Generally, 
our results for the control variables are confirmed. For the domestic capital stock though, 
we find no consistent effect of inward FDI in input or output sectors or of outward FDI in 
output sectors. Even if some of these variables are significant, results are not stable across 
the different types of specifications for the cointegration estimators. The effects of inward 
FDI in input sectors, for instance, is positive when using the FMOLS estimator 
(unreported) and insignificant when using the Two-Step estimator. Using the Two-Step 
estimator, inward FDI of output sectors even has a negative effect on the domestic capital 
stock, but this finding is not robust across unreported different model specifications. The 
only inter-industry effect which has a consistent effect across specifications is that of 
outward FDI in input sectors. This variable has a positive and significant effect at least at 
the 5% level of significant. This confirms our hypothesis that outward FDI which makes 
input sectors more competitive has a positive spill-over effect.  
I
itFDI
O
itFDI
For inward FDI, there is greater evidence for positive inter-sector linkages than for the 
domestic capital stock. All four proxies of inter-industry linkages considered increase 
inward FDI. Moreover, the estimated elasticities are quite high (around 0.5). Thus, for the 
investment for foreign held multinationals, the coefficients have the predicted sign and 
are significant. Outward FDI in input sectors, which can be interpreted as a reduction of 
output prices, leads to higher investment of foreign multinationals. Similarly, inward FDI 
in input sectors should lead to lower input prices, which explains the positive impact on 
domestic investment.   
To sum up the evidence on industry-linkages, we find consistent but rather weak effects 
of inter-industry effects of FDI on domestic investment. Hence, even when inter-industry 
effects are not taken into account, we can expect not to miss important effects with one 
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particular industry. Understanding the determinant of inward FDI, in contrast, requires 
using information about inter-sector linkages. Note, in addition, that our measures of 
input and output sector FDI capture the FDI of other industries only. Since almost a third 
of inputs and outputs is traded within industries, we cannot isolate this effect from the 
overall competition effects captured by our measures of same-sector FDI. 
Effects of industry concentration 
Splitting inward and outward FDI along different dimensions (results not reported) gives 
no clear answer to the question whether market-access-driven or production-cost-driven 
FDI is behind these results. On the one hand, outward FDI into different sectors (one 
proxy for vertical FDI) has a positive impact on the domestic capital stock. On the other 
hand, outward FDI into high-income countries (one proxy for horizontal FDI) has a 
positive effect as well. As regards inward FDI, FDI into different sectors and from high 
income countries have a positive impact on the domestic capital stock.  
Our theoretical model shows that positive effects of outward FDI on the domestic capital 
stock are more likely the lower the price elasticity of product demand – and thus the 
lower the degree of competition. We do not have time-varying information on the price 
elasticity of product demand for different industries at hand. Hence, we proxy the degree 
of competition by the industry-level Herfindahl index. Information on the Herfindahl 
index is obtained from the German Antitrust Commission, the Monopolkommission 
(2006), for the year 2003 for 17 sectors under study. We use the Herfindahl to split the 
sample into sectors with a degree of competition above and below the median. Results for 
these sample splits are reported in Table 6.8
Our expectation is that a higher degree of competition in an industry makes a positive 
response of the domestic capital stock less likely. We would thus expect a less positive or 
even negative response of domestic capital (inward FDI) in industries with a Herfindahl 
below the median, and a more positive response in industries with a Herfindahl above the 
                                                 
8  Note that the following results are based on fixed effects panel regressions using the first lags of each 
variable to control for the endogeneity of the regressors and robust standard errors. We do not report 
panel cointegration test since the number of observations is relatively small for the individual sub-
samples. 
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median. Our main results for domestic capital do not support this (see Table 6a). In both 
sub-samples, the effect of outward FDI is insignificant. However, in unreported fixed 
effects regressions the effect of outward FDI is weakly positive in sectors with a low 
degree of competition and insignificant otherwise.  
Effects of the share of multinationals 
Our theoretical model also suggests that the number of multinational firms which are 
active in an industry affect the response of the domestic capital stock to FDI. The higher 
the share of multinationals, the more likely is a positive response. To test this prediction, 
we use two time-invariant proxies for the importance of multinational firms in an 
industry: the number of domestic headquarters of multinational firms and the number of 
foreign affiliates of domestic firms. Both measures are measured in relation to the total 
number of firms in an industry. For the domestic capital stock, our results strongly 
support our theoretical hypothesis. The effect of outward FDI on domestic capital is 
positive in industries with an above-average share of multinational firms. There is even 
weak evidence for a negative response of the domestic capital stocks in sectors with a 
below-average importance of multinational firms. 
Interestingly, these patterns in the data are not confirmed for the regressions using inward 
FDI as the dependent variable (see Table 6b). Here, the link between outward FDI and 
the domestic capital stock is positive in all sub-samples, and the coefficient estimates are 
even higher in the industries with a high degree of competition. One reason for these 
differences in the responses of domestic capital and inward FDI could be that our proxies 
for the degree of competition and the share of multinationals are related to domestic, not 
foreign industries. Therefore, results support our approach of treating the response of the 
domestic capital stock and of inward FDI separately.  
4.2.1 Short-Run Dynamics 
The analysis so far has focused on the long-run determinants of domestic investment. 
Earlier studies, in contrast, have focused on the short-run dynamics of the domestic 
capital stock by using its first difference or gross capital formation as the dependent 
variable. To check whether the relationships borne out in the long-run also affect the 
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short-run adjustment responses of the domestic capital stock, we have also estimated 
equation (3) using first differences of the data.  
Table 7 presents regression results using the growth of the domestic capital stock and of 
inward FDI as the dependent variable. All regressions are estimated using a panel fixed 
effects estimator with robust standard errors to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Tables 7a and 7b have the results for domestic capital and inward 
FDI. We present results of fixed effects panel regressions as well as of instrumental 
variable regressions. Desai et al. (2005b) propose using weighted foreign GDP growth as 
an instrument for the foreign variables. However, Harrison and McMillan (2006) argue 
that foreign variables such as GDP growth are significant determinants of domestic 
variables (in their case employment) and thus propose using a set of exogenous foreign 
variables (GDP per capita, tariffs, education expenditures, telephone mainlines etc.). 
Here, we simply used lagged FDI terms as well as lags of the remaining explanatory 
variables as instruments.  
All regressions are estimated without time fixed effects. The reason for not including 
time fixed effects is that these would eliminate the general trend in the data. Our 
equations would explain the idiosyncratic deviations of the growth rates from these 
trends. In unreported regressions, we have checked the sensitivity of our results by 
including time fixed effects. Some of the explanatory variables such as employment, 
value added, and wages become insignificant in these regressions, suggesting that these 
variables in fact pick up trends in the data that are common to all cross-sections. Our 
main results for the impact of FDI are unaffected by including time fixed effects.  
Turning to the results for the growth in the domestically-owned capital stock first, which 
are reported in Table 7a, we find positive effects of employment and wage growth. The 
elasticity of investment with regard to employment is about 0.2, the elasticity with regard 
to wages is about 0.3. The IV estimates yield higher elasticities for employment but lower 
values for wages. The impact of output growth is insignificant. These results are not 
affected by adding different measures of FDI as regressors. The FDI measures are 
(weakly) significant in only one specification, as we find a negative coefficient of the 
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growth of inward FDI on the domestic capital stock. This effect is insignificant though in 
the IV-estimates.  
We also estimate the same set of regressions using the change in inward FDI instead of 
domestic capital stock as the dependent variable. Results are given in Table 7b. Growth 
in the domestic capital stock is added as an additional explanatory variable, but the main 
results are confirmed also by regressions excluding growth of the domestic capital stock. 
The link between growth in inward FDI and our standard control variables is weak. If 
anything, there is a positive impact of growth in value added. In contrast to the results for 
domestic capital, we now find a positive and significant impact of growth in outward FDI 
(both in terms of volume and in terms of the number of firms investing abroad) on inward 
FDI. This effect is insignificant though in the IV estimates.  
Overall, results using the first difference of the domestic capital stock as the dependent 
variable provide less stable results on the link between the stock of foreign investment 
and the domestic capital stock. Moreover, these estimates do not inform us about the 
underlying long-run relationships in the data.  
5 Summary 
What are the effects of the increasing activities of multinational firms on the home 
economy? Much of the earlier literature addressing the home-country effects of FDI 
stresses labor market implications, and many recent papers use firm-level data. The focus 
of this paper is on the long-run implications of FDI on the domestic capital stock and on 
the effects of FDI at the industry-level. Our approach also allows distinguishing intra-
sector competition from inter-sector linkage effects. 
Our theoretical model has shown that the impact of FDI on domestic investment depends 
on the motive that drives the foreign investment as well as on the industry from which 
this foreign investment originates. Market seeking investment tends to have a positive 
impact, production cost motivated investments can have both a positive and a negative 
impact. In the latter case, it is more likely to be positive the less price elastic industry 
demand and the larger the share of multinational firms in this industry. FDI in input 
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industries tends to have a positive impact on the domestic capital stock whereas FDI in 
output industries can have a positive or a negative effect. 
Our empirical results based on a detailed dataset on German FDI can be summarized as 
follows: 
First, in the long-run, the effect of FDI on the domestic capital stock across industries is 
positive. This holds for the capital stock owned by domestic investors and the stock of 
inward FDI. For the domestic capital stock, this positive effect tends to be stronger the 
more multinational firms are active in an industry, as predicted by our model. 
Second, we split FDI into proxies for FDI driven by market-access considerations and 
FDI driven by cost considerations. Generally, we confirm the positive impact of FDI on 
the domestic capital stock. However, results give no clear-cut implications as to whether 
this effect is driven by a particular type of FDI.  
Third, FDI of other input and output sectors has no significant impact on the domestic 
capital stock. The stock of inward FDI increases though if other input and output sectors 
engage in more FDI. When assessing the effects of FDI on the domestic capital stock, 
intra-sector effects thus dominate. Due to a high share of inputs and outputs that are 
traded within industries, this may be due to both, competition and linkage effects.  
Fourth, understanding the long-run impact of FDI on domestic economic activity requires 
estimating the long-run (cointegration) parameters. Estimating the model in first 
differences shows that the short-run link between the domestic capital stock and the stock 
of FDI is rather weak.  
Overall, we show that the activities of multinationals affect the allocation of capital 
across industries. At the aggregated level, increasing activities of German firms abroad 
and – to a somewhat smaller degree – of foreign firms in Germany have been associated 
with relatively stable patterns of the capital stock and employment. Yet, at the industry-
level, differences are quite distinct. Industries that have invested more abroad have, in the 
longer run, also increased their domestic capital stock. 
 27
  
6 References  
Banerjee, A., M. Marcellino, and C. Osbat (2005). Testing for PPP: Should we use panel 
methods? Empirical Economics 30: 77-91. 
Barba-Navaretti, G., A.J. Venables, F. Barry, K. Ekholm, A. Falzoni, J. Haaland, K-H. 
Midelfart, and A. Turrini (2004). Multinational Firms in the World Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Becker, S.O., and M.-A. Muendler (2006). The Effects of FDI on Worker Displacement. 
University of Munich and UC San Diego. Mimeo. 
Breitung, J. (2000). The Local Power of Some Unit Root Tests for Panel Data, in: B. 
Baltagi (ed.). Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels. 
Advances in Econometrics, Vol. 15, JAI: Amsterdam, 161-178. 
Breitung, J. (2005). A Parametric Approach to the Estimation of Cointegration Vectors in 
Panel Data. Econometric Review 23(2): 151-173. 
Breitung, J., and S. Das (2005). Panel unit root tests under cross-sectional dependence. 
Statistica Neerlandica 59(4): 414-433. 
Buch, C.M., and A. Lipponer (2007). Volatile Multinationals? Evidence from the Labor 
Demand of German Firms. University of Tübingen and Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Mimeo. 
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley and J.R. Hines, Jr. (2005). Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Domestic Capital Stock. American Economic Review: 33-38.   
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R. Hines (2005b). Foreign Direct Investment and 
Domestic Economic Activity. National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER 
Working Paper 11717. Cambridge MA. 
Faeth, I. (2006). Consequences of FDI in Australia – Causal Links Between FDI, 
Domestic Investment, Economic Growth and Trade. Department of Economics 
Research Paper 977. Melbourne, Australia. 
Feldstein, M. (1995). The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct Investment on the 
Domestic Capital Stock. In: Feldstein, M., J.R. Hines Jr., and R.G. Hubbard 
(eds.). The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations. Chicago 
(University of Chicago Press). 43-63. 
Hanson, G.H., R.J. Mataloni Jr., and M.J. Slaughter (2003). Expansion Abroad and the 
Domestic Operations of U. S. Multinational Firms. University of California and 
NBER. Mimeo. 
Harrison, A.E., and M.S. McMillan (2006). Outsourcing Jobs? Multinationals and US 
Employment. National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper 
12372. Cambridge MA. (forthcoming in: Industrial Relations) 
 28
  
Hejazi, W., and P. Pauly (2002). Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Capital 
Formation. Industry Canada Research Publications Program. Working Paper 16. 
Toronto. 
Hejazi, W., and P. Pauly (2003). Motivations for FDI and domestic capital formation. 
Journal of International Business Studies 34: 282-289. 
Herzer, D., and M. Schrooten (2007). Outward FDI and Domestic Investment. Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). Discussion Paper 679. Berlin. 
Im, K.S., M. H. Pesaran, and Y. Shin (2003). Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels. Journal of Econometrics 115: 53–74. 
Kao, C. (1999). Spurious regressions and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel 
data. Journal of Econometrics 90: 1-44. 
Kleinert, J., and Toubal, F. (2006). The Impact of Locating Production Abroad on 
Activities at Home: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data. University of 
Tübingen and Sorbonne (Paris). Mimeo. 
Levin, A., C. Lin, and C. Chu (2002). Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and 
Finite Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics 108: 1–24. 
Lipponer, A. (2006a). Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) – A Brief Guide. 
Deutsche Bundesbank. Frankfurt a.M. 
Lipponer, A. (2006b). Die deutschen Direktinvestitionsbeziehungen mit dem Ausland: 
neuere Entwicklungstendenzen und makroökonomische Auswirkungen. Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Monatsbericht September. Frankfurt a.M.: 45-62. 
Monopolkommission (2006). Anlagenband zum Sechzehnten Hauptgutachten der 
Monopolkommission 2004/2005. Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/2461. 
25.8.2006. Berlin. 
Pedroni, P. (2000). Fully modified OLS for heterogenous cointegrated panels. Advances 
in Econometrics. 15: 93-130. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2006).World 
Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development. New York and Geneva. 
 29
  
Appendix 
Data Definitions and Sources 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Measures of inward and outward FDI at the industry-level are obtained from the firm-
level database Micro-Database Direct Investment (MiDi), provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. The data are confidential and can be used on the premises of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank only. We clean the data in several ways in order to account for changes in 
the reporting limits and to eliminate allocated sectors. For details see Section 3.1 in the 
main text. Details on the database are given in Lipponer (2006a). 
Industry-level data  
Unless indicated otherwise, the following data are for the year 1991-2003 and are taken 
from the OECD’s Stan database (http://www.oecd.org/) and the Genesis database by the 
German Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de/). We use the latest classification 
(WZ03) that is compatible with EU standard NACE Ref 1.1. which, in turn, is fully 
consistent with the ISIC Rev. 3 categories used in the STAN-data. 
o Real gross value added (Bruttowertschöpfung) (2000 = 100), Code PRO013 
o Gross wages in million € , 1991-2003, Code VST005 
o Number of employees in 1000 (headcounts), 1991-2003, Code ERW005 
o Exports by manufacturing sector, 1991-2003, OECD Stan Database 
o Imports by manufacturing sector, 1991-2003, OECD Stan Database 
o Gross capital stock (Nettoanlagevermögen) in constant prices of 2000 in 
million €, Code VGR074-VGRANLART01 
o Number of employees (Arbeitnehmer) in 1000 (used to compute hourly wages) 
o Industry Herfindahl (Monopolkommission 2006) (absolute HHI based on 
enterprises) (for the year 2003) 
o Input-Output coefficients industry by industry and by year, 1991-2000, are from 
the German Statistical Office (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen. Input-
Output-Rechnung in jeweiligen Preisen) 
o Share of multinational firms: number of parents of multinational firms and 
number of foreign affiliates of German multinationals (both calculated based on 
MiDi) relative to number of firms per industry (obtained from the 
Unternehmensregister of the German Statistical Office) (for the year 2004) 
The following data are taken from the Groningen 60-Industry Database (Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, 
http://www.ggdc.net/.) 
o Hours worked per annum 
o Labor costs per employees (Arbeitskosten pro Arbeitnehmer)  
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Figure 1: FDI and Foreign Employment in % of Total 
The aggregates for West comprise Berlin, East is East Germany without (East-) Berlin. 
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Total West East
 
 31
  
(d) Employment in German affiliates of foreign firms in % of domestic employment 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Full Versus Reduced Sample 
This Table compares the full sample to the sample from which the industries Agriculture, Education and 
health, General government, Holdings, International organizations, Mining and quarrying, Non-profit 
organizations serving households, Other, Other community and social services, Other service activities, 
Private households, Recreational activities, and Sewage and refuse disposal have been removed. In 
addition, stricter reporting requirements which have been applied in later years of the sample period have 
been applied backward. MiDi-labels are given in parentheses. 
(a) Outward FDI (K3)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Full sample    
Affiliate sales (pk04) 411,181 32,322 379,791 
Affiliate employment (pk05) 411,181 132 957 
Volume of FDI (pdum1) 356,946 15,598 227,354 
Restricted sample    
Affiliate sales (pk04) 175,672 46,054 539,807 
Affiliate employment (pk05) 175,672 186 1,277 
Volume of FDI (pdum1) 159,150 20,239 290,422 
 
(b) Inward FDI (K4)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Full sample    
Affiliate sales (pk04) 252,249 33,972 288,401 
Affiliate employment (pk05) 252,249 107 689 
Volume of FDI (pdum1) 210,885 13,825 159,361 
Restricted sample    
Affiliate sales (pk04) 103,219 47,053 335,237 
Affiliate employment (pk05) 103,219 137 887 
Volume of FDI (pdum1) 92,202 13,368 72,750 
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Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests 
This Table reports the test statistics of panel unit root tests based on Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003), and Breitung and Das (2005). Number of observations are for the tests by Levin, 
Lin, and Chu, and Im, Pesaran, and Shin. The Null-Hypothesis is that the series contain a unit root. The 
maximum lag length was set at 8 quarters, basing the automatic lag selection on the SIC criterion. Newey-
West bandwidth selection uses a Bartlett kernel. All variables are in logs. *, **, *** = significant at the 
10%, 5%, 1%-level. 
Variable 
Cross sections 
(number of 
observations) 
Levin, Lin, Chu Im, Pesaran, Shin Breitung and Das 
Levels     
Domestic capital stock 24 (272) –16.15*** –8.16*** 8.77 
Employment 24 (269) –7.33*** –2.07** 3.47 
Real value added 24 (249) –7.33*** –2.07** 3.47 
Inward FDI (volume) 24 (270) –4.89*** –0.96 –1.32* 
Outward FDI (volume) 24 (270) –1.99** 0.22 0.82 
First Differences     
Domestic capital stock 24 (253) –6.30*** –0.61 –1.20 
Employment 24 (252) –5.12*** 0.49 0.48 
Real value added 24 (249) –12.46*** –4.78*** –5.90*** 
Inward FDI (volume) 24 (252) –13.36*** –6.19*** –3.81*** 
Outward FDI (volume) 24 (249) –10.85*** –3.38*** –4.30*** 
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Table 4: Panel Cointegration Tests  
This Table presents results of the panel cointegration tests proposed by Kao (1997) and Pedroni (1995). 
Kao’s (1997) tests DFρ and DFt are based on the assumption of strong exogeneity of the regressors and 
errors; DF*ρ and DF*t are based on the assumption of endogeneity of regressors and errors. The H0 
hypothesis is ‘no cointegration’. Pedroni’s tests allow for heterogeneity in the cointegration relationships 
and are based on the H0 of no cointegration as well. The regression equations include employment, wages, 
output, and inward or outward FDI. *, **, *** = significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%-level. 
Dependent variable Domestic capital stock Domestic capital stock Stock of inward FDI 
FDI measure Outward  Inward  Outward  
ρDF  –0.09 –0.04 –5.47*** 
tDF  –0.54 –0.29 –4.15*** 
*
ρDF  –4.20*** –4.23*** –9.48*** 
*
tDF  –2.18** –2.00** –4.93*** 
NTt ρˆ  –167.78*** –150.97*** –150.26*** 
ρ1Nt  –17.15*** –17.19*** –20.11*** 
ρ2Nt  –16.48*** –16.52*** –19.31*** 
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Table 5: Long-Run Cointegration Coefficients  
Tables 5a and 5b present estimates for the long-run cointegration parameters using a fully modified OLS 
estimator (FMOLS), a dynamic OLS estimator (DOLS), and the Two-Step estimator proposed by Breitung 
(2005). In Table 5c and 5d, only results using the Two-Step estimator are presented. All estimates 
presented are for the years 1991-2003 and are based on a sample with N = 21 and T = 13. *, **, *** = 
significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%-level. 
(a) Domestic Capital Stock (Baseline)
 FMOLS DOLS Two-Step FMOLS DOLS Two-Step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment 0.44*** 
(5.93) 
0.40*** 
(4.43) 
0.44*** 
(9.05) 
0.38*** 
(5.08) 
0.34*** 
(3.70) 
0.39*** 
(7.38) 
Wages 0.49*** 
(7.58) 
0.23*** 
(2.93) 
0.64*** 
(14.95) 
0.40*** 
(5.45) 
0.22*** 
(2.51) 
0.56*** 
(10.32) 
Output 0.16*** 
(2.65) 
0.10 
(1.44) 
0.16*** 
(4.03) 
0.18*** 
(2.91) 
0.14* 
(1.83) 
0.24**** 
(5.88) 
Inward FDI 0.05*** 
(3.23) 
0.04*** 
(2.48) 
0.03*** 
(2.74) 
   
Outward FDI    0.04*** 
(3.04) 
0.03** 
(1.88) 
0.02*** 
(2.72) 
Number of groups 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R² 0.62 0.68  0.62 0.67  
(b) Inward FDI (Baseline)
 FMOLS DOLS Two–Step FMOLS DOLS Two–Step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employment –0.88*** 
(–2.38) 
–1.42*** 
(–3.23) 
–0.90*** 
(–3.47) 
–1.22*** 
(–3.12) 
–2.05*** 
(–4.38) 
–1.25*** 
(–4.55) 
Wages 0.37 
(1.04) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.43) 
0.14 
(0.31) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
–0.60* 
(–1.90) 
Output 0.97*** 
(3.25) 
1.34*** 
(3.75) 
1.04*** 
(5.16) 
0.81*** 
(2.65) 
0.80*** 
(2.20) 
1.01*** 
(5.11) 
Domestic capital stock    0.85*** 
(2.33) 
2.12*** 
(4.84) 
0.76*** 
(2.48) 
Outward FDI 0.48*** 
(7.27) 
0.56*** 
(7.01) 
0.49*** 
(10.33) 
0.45*** 
(6.86) 
0.50*** 
(6.35) 
0.51*** 
(11.06) 
Number of groups 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R² 0.53 0.60  0.51 0.66  
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(c) Domestic Capital Stock (Including Sector Linkages)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employment 0.45*** 
(9.05) 
 0.47*** 
(9.83) 
0.37*** 
(6.74) 
 0.40*** 
(7.42) 
Wages 0.64*** 
(12.78) 
 0.75*** 
(15.85) 
0.48*** 
(7.13) 
 0.62*** 
(9.77) 
Output 0.14*** 
(3.46) 
 0.13*** 
(3.32) 
0.22*** 
(5.16) 
 0.22*** 
(5.29) 
Inward FDI 0.03*** 
(2.89) 
 0.04*** 
(4.17) 
  
Outward FDI   0.02 
(1.62) 
0.02** 
(2.08) 
Inward FDI input sectors 0.01 
(0.42) 
   
Inward FDI output sectors  –0.10*** 
(–4.18) 
  
Outward FDI input sectors   0.04** 
(2.69) 
 
Outward FDI output 
sectors 
   –0.01 
(–0.57) 
Number of groups 21 21 21 21 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
 
(d) Inward FDI (Including Sector Linkages)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employment –1.05*** 
(–2.70) 
–1.12*** 
(–3.59) 
–1.18*** 
(–3.86) 
–0.75** 
(–2.54) 
Wages  0.45 
(–0.02) 
–0.32 
(–0.83) 
–0.44 
(–1.18) 
–0.59 
(–1.56) 
Output  1.03*** 
(4.91) 
 1.38*** 
(6.35) 
 1.32*** 
(6.07) 
 1.17*** 
(5.46) 
Domestic capital 
stock 
 0.72*** 
(2.63) 
 1.50*** 
(4.31) 
 0.74** 
(2.15) 
 1.07*** 
(3.27) 
Inward FDI  
input sectors 
 0.66*** 
(5.47)    
Inward FDI output 
sectors 
  0.73*** 
(5.72) 
  
Outward FDI input 
sectors 
  0.48*** 
(6.21) 
 
Outward FDI output 
sectors 
   0.43*** 
(7.03) 
Number of groups 21 21 21 21 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
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Table 6: Sample Splits by Degree of Competition and MNE Share  
In panel (a), the log of the domestic capital stock owned by domestic residents is the dependent variable. In 
panel (b), the log of inward FDI is the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are in logs. Unification 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the years 1991-1994. All regressions are fixed effects panel 
estimators using robust standard errors clustered at the industry-level. For the IV estimates, the instruments 
used are the one-period lagged values of log domestic capital stock, log employment, log real value added, 
and log FDI. MNE share = number of multinational enterprises per industry relative to number of domestic 
firms. Affiliate share = number of foreign affiliates of German firms per industry relative to number of 
domestic firms. *** (**, *)  = significant at the 1% (5%, 10%)-level.  
(a) Domestic capital stock
 Full sample 
Herfindahl 
> median 
Herfindahl 
< median 
MNE 
share > 
median 
MNE 
share < 
median 
Affiliate 
share > 
median 
Affiliate 
share < 
median 
Employment 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.32** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41***
 [4.01] [3.21] [2.19] [3.82] [4.22] [3.39] [4.33]
Wages 0.21 0.2 0.33 -0.01 0.87*** -0.07 0.94***
 [1.54] [1.12] [1.34] [0.11] [4.00] [0.56] [4.14]
Output 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.01
 [2.80] [3.31] [0.16] [1.21] [0.18] [0.77] [0.05]
Outward FDI 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06** -0.02 0.07** -0.03**
 [1.49] [1.44] [0.27] [2.28] [1.63] [2.55] [2.04]
Unification -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.04**
 [4.73] [3.42] [5.02] [3.88] [3.11] [4.59] [2.50]
Observations 252 144 108 120 132 127 125
Number of groups 21 12 9 10 11 13 12
 
(b) Inward FDI
 Full sample 
Herfindahl 
> median 
Herfindahl 
< median 
MNE 
share > 
median 
MNE 
share < 
median 
Affiliate 
share > 
median 
Affiliate 
share < 
median 
Domestic capital 
stock  0.8 0.68 1.14 -2.18** 2.90* -1.16 2.88*
 [0.80] [0.42] [1.03] [2.28] [1.89] [1.29] [1.88]
Employment -1.61** -1.32 -1.34 0.18 -3.04*** -0.57 -2.89***
 [2.02] [1.54] [0.78] [0.22] [2.91] [1.10] [2.73]
Wages 0.14 0.57 -0.59 0.71 -1.86 0.79 -1.75
 [0.16] [0.51] [0.37] [0.97] [1.02] [1.18] [0.90]
Output 1.12*** 1.35*** -0.83 1.42*** 1.40** 1.68*** 1.29**
 [3.34] [2.74] [0.58] [2.98] [2.25] [3.76] [2.09]
Outward FDI 0.51*** 0.37* 1.02*** 0.44** 0.69*** 0.2 0.69***
 [3.33] [1.76] [4.23] [2.42] [3.70] [1.51] [3.54]
Unification 0.12 0.03 0.30*** -0.05 0.19 0.08 0.2
 [1.34] [0.25] [2.59] [0.52] [1.47] [0.77] [1.44]
Observations 252 144 108 120 132 127 125
Number of groups 21 12 9 10 11 13 12
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Table 7: Estimation in First Differences  
All variables are entered as first differences of their logs. In panel (a), the change in the domestic capital 
stock owned by domestic residents is the dependent variable. In panel (b), the change in the volume of 
inward FDI is the dependent variable. Unification is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the years 
1991-1994. All regressions are fixed effects panel estimators using robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry-level. For the IV estimates, the instruments used are the one-period lagged values of ∆ log 
domestic capital stock, ∆ log employment, ∆ log real value added, ∆ log volume outward FDI, ∆ log inward 
count and ∆ log outward count, where count is the number of foreign affiliates in each industry. *** (**, *)  
= significant at the 1% (5%, 10%)-level.  
(a) Change in the domestic capital stock
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel estimates Panel IV estimates 
∆ Employment 0.17** 0.19** 0.18** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
 (2.22) (2.46) (2.17) (4.38) (3.93) (3.08) 
∆ Output 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.07 
 (0.73) (1.01) (0.76) (1.23) (0.85) (1.23) 
∆ Wages  0.33*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.17** 0.20* 0.17* 
 (4.82) (4.87) (4.84) (2.19) (1.68) (1.97) 
∆ Inward FDI  -0.03**   0.01  
  (-2.08)   (0.30)  
∆ Outward FDI   0.00   0.00 
   (-0.33)   (0.0092) 
Unification 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (13.7) (12.9) (13.7) (9.25) (7.56) (8.04) 
Constant 0.00 0.01** 0.00    
 (0.60) (2.25) (0.60)    
Observations 268 268 268 245 245 245 
Number of groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Adjusted R² 0.51 0.58 0.51    
(b) Change in inward FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel estimates Panel IV estimates 
∆ Domestic capital stock -4.41*** -4.37*** -4.48*** . 11.37 13.27 
 (-4.40) (-4.22) (-4.48) . (0.34) (0.38) 
∆ Employment 1.29** 0.83 1.14** 0.06 -8.75 -11.54 
 (2.11) (1.40) (2.08) (0.11) (-0.40) (-0.50) 
∆ Output 0.54*** 0.27* 0.2 0.13 -2.23 -2.51 
 (3.86) (1.75) (1.06) (0.77) (-0.67) (-0.70) 
∆ Wages  -0.34 -0.53 -0.91 -1.98 -4 -4.27 
 (-0.45) (-0.66) (-1.21) (-1.71) (-0.56) (-0.59) 
∆ Outward FDI  0.33**  0.34**  0.22 
  (2.25)  (2.29)  (0.61) 
Unification 0.23** 0.23** 0.25** 0.01 -0.73 -0.86 
 (2.49) (2.32) (2.66) (0.15) (-0.39) (-0.45) 
Constant 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12***   
 (5.85) (4.65) (5.46) (3.61)   
Observations 268 268 268 268 245 245 
Number of groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Adjusted R² 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.11   
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Mathematical Appendix
In the Appendix we will drop all indices referring to production functions f,
g and h for notational convenience.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a purely domestic enterprise (PDE) that maximzes the following
profit function
piPDE = pg(L,K)− wL− rK (5)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
piL = pgL − w = 0 (6)
piK = pgK − r = 0 (7)
To determine how the capital stock of a PDE reacts to changes in p note
that
dK
dp
=
|FKp|
|F | (8)
where
F =
∣∣∣∣∣ pgLL pgLKpgKL pgKK
∣∣∣∣∣
and
FKp =
∣∣∣∣∣ pgLL −gLpgKL −gK
∣∣∣∣∣
To ensure that the solution corresponds to a profit maximum, we need to
check that |F | > 0. It is straightforward to show that
|F | = pgLLpgKK − pgLKpgKL (9)
= p2
1
L2
1
K2
g2[α(α− 1)β(β − 1)− α2β2] > 0 (10)
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if α + β < 1, as assumed above.
Since |F | > 0, signdK
dp
= sign|FKp|.
Note that
|FKp| = −p
(−)︷︸︸︷
gLL gK + p
(+)︷︸︸︷
gKL
(+)︷︸︸︷
gL > 0 (11)
Thus, we obtain that dK
dp
> 0 for PDE.
Consider next a domestic multinational enterprise (MNE) that maximizes
the following profit function.
piMNE = pf(L, L˜,K, K˜)− wL− w˜L˜− rK − r˜K˜ (12)
= pLαL˜α˜KβK˜ β˜ − wL− w˜L˜− rK − r˜K˜ (13)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
piL = pf
α
L
− w = 0 (14)
piL˜ = pf
α˜
L˜
− w˜ = 0 (15)
piK = pf
β
K
− r = 0 (16)
piK˜ = pf
β˜
K˜
− r˜ = 0 (17)
To see how an MNE reacts to changes in w˜ we examine
dK
dw˜
=
|FKw˜|
|F | and
dK˜
dw˜
=
|FK˜w˜|
|F | (18)
Note that
F =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pf α(α−1)
L2
pf α
L
α˜
L˜
pf α
L
β
K
pf α
L
β˜
K˜
pf α˜
L˜
α
L
pf α˜(α˜−1)
L˜2
pf α˜
L˜
β
K
pf α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜
pf β
K
α
L
pf β
K
α˜
L˜
pf β(β−1)
K2
pf β
K
β˜
K˜
pf β˜
K˜
α
L
pf β˜
K˜
α˜
L˜
pf β˜
K˜
β
K
pf β˜(β˜−1)
K˜2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(19)
and that |F | > 0 due to the assumption that ∑α+∑ β < 1.
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Now we determine MNEs reaction to a change in output prices.
dK
dp
=
|FKp|
|F | (20)
Note that sign
|FKp|
|F | = sign|FKp|, as |F | > 0.
Note further that
|FKp| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pf α(α−1)
L2
pf α
L
α˜
L˜
−f α
L
pf α
L
β˜
K˜
pf α˜
L˜
α
L
pf α˜(α˜−1)
L˜2
−f α˜
L˜
pf α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜
pf β
K
α
L
pf β
K
α˜
L˜
−f β
K
pf β
K
β˜
K˜
pf β˜
K˜
α
L
pf β˜
K˜
α˜
L˜
−f β˜
K˜
pf β˜(β˜−1)
K˜2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(21)
It is straightforward to show that
|FKp| = p3f 4 α
L2
β
K
β˜
K˜2
α˜
L˜2
> 0 (22)
An analogous argument can be made to show that an FHE increases its
factor demand for domestic capital as a reaction to a price increase. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
To determine the impact of a decrease in the domestic input price w on
PDEs’ factor demand, we need to determine
dK
dw
=
|FKw|
|F |
dL
dw
=
|FLw|
|F | (23)
Note that
FKw =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pf α(α−1)
L2
pf α
L
α˜
L˜
1 pf α
L
β˜
K˜
pf α˜
L˜
α
L
pf α˜(α˜−1)
L˜2
0 pf α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜
pf β
K
α
L
pf β
K
α˜
L˜
0 pf β
K
β˜
K˜
pf β˜
K˜
α
L
pf β˜
K˜
α˜
L˜
0 pf β˜(β˜−1)
K˜2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(24)
Note that sign |FKr||F | = sign|FKr| as |F | > 0.
It is straightforward to show that
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|FKw| = −p3f 3α
L
β
K
β˜
K˜2
α˜
L˜2
< 0 (25)
Similarly we get
FLw =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 pf α
L
α˜
L˜
pf α
L
β
K
pf α
L
β˜
K˜
0 pf α˜(α˜−1)
L˜2
pf α˜
L˜
β
K
pf α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜
0 pf β
K
α˜
L˜
pf β(β−1)
K2
pf β
K
β˜
K˜
0 pf β˜
K˜
α˜
L˜
pf β˜
K˜
β
K
pf β˜(β˜−1)
K˜2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(26)
and
|FLw| = p3f 3 α˜ββ˜
L˜2K2K˜2
(a˜+ β + β˜ − 1) < 0 (27)
since by assumption
∑
α +
∑
β < 1.
The same analysis applies to PDEs and FHEs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider first an MNE. Note that
sign
dK
dw˜
= sign
|FKw˜|
|F | = sign|FKw˜| (28)
as |F | > 0. Furthermore, note that
FKw˜ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pf α(α−1)
L2
pf α
L
α˜
L˜
0 pf α
L
β˜
K˜
pf α˜
L˜
α
L
pf α˜(α˜−1)
L˜2
1 pf α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜
pf β
K
α
L
pf β
K
α˜
L˜
0 pf β
K
β˜
K˜
pf β˜
K˜
α
L
pf β˜
K˜
α˜
L˜
0 pf β˜(β˜−1)
K˜2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(29)
It is straightforward to show that
|FKw˜| = −p3f 3 β
K
α˜
L˜
β˜
K˜2
α
L2
< 0 (30)
We can derive analogous results for FHEs.
Note that there is no direct impact a change in w˜ would have on PDEs
domestic factor demand. However, there is an indirect effect due to the price
effect.
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To see this, recall that the market clearing condition is
D(p) = qf(p) + (1− q)g(p) (31)
assuming that only MNEs and PDEs produce for the local market and that
their total number adds up to one.
Note that
dp
dw˜
= −
−q
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂f
∂w˜
−(1− q)
=0︷︸︸︷
∂g
∂w˜
D′(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
−q ∂f
∂p︸︷︷︸
(+)
−(1− q) ∂g
∂p︸︷︷︸
(+)
> 0 (32)
Thus, the price decrease resulting from a decrease in w˜ will lower PDEs
input demand for K, as we have seen in Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 1
In order to derive the total impact a change in w˜ has on domestic capital
demand we need to determine
dKtotal
dw˜
= q
dKMNE
d ˜˜w
+ (1− q)dKPDE
dw˜
(33)
= q
dKMNE
d ˜˜w︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
q ∂KMNE∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+(1− q) ∂KPDE
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dpdw˜︸︷︷︸
(+)
> or < 0(34)
The sign depends on the relative size of these effects. The larger q, the
more likely it is to be negative, i.e. the more likely it is that a decrease in
w˜ increases domestic capital demand. Similarly, the smaller the price effect,
the more likely it is that the sign is negative, i.e. the more likely it is for a
foreign wage decrease to have a positive impact on domestic capital demand.
Q.E.D.
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